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Dichotomous Choice Contingent Valuation with ‘Dont Know’ Responses and
Misreporting.
Summary
A new approach is presented that simultaneously deals with Misreporting and Don’t
Know (DK) responses within a Dichotomous Choice contingent valuation framework. Util-
ising a modification of the standard Bayesian Probit framework, a Gibbs with Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm is used to estimate the posterior densities for the parameters of interest.
Several model specifications are applied to two CV data sets. The first is on Wolf Man-
agement Plans. The second on the US Fee Demonstration Program. In contrast to other
studies we find that DKs are more likely to be from people who would be predicted to
have a positive utility for the bid. Therefore, a DK is more likely to be a YES than a NO.
We also find evidence of misreporting, primarily in favour of the NO option. Finally, our
willingness-to-pay estimates are both less than and greater than those previously reported
which reflects the fact that inclusion of DK responses has no a priori impact on the key
parameters of interest in this literature.
KeyWords: Contingent Valuation, Don’t Knows, Uncertainty, Misreporting, Bayesian
Probit
JEL: C25, C11, Q51
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1. Introduction
The expressed preference (EP) literature has long recognised that psychological and
cognitive factors play a role in determining the values that are elicited from individuals, and
may also lead to uncertainty by the individual about their own choices/preferences (e.g.
Kahnmand and Tversky, 2000, Li and Mattson, 1995, Samnaliev et al. 2006). Likewise,
research has also identified that people may either intentionally or unintentionally report
preferences that would not be ‘revealed’ in a real situation i.e., misreport (e.g., Balcombe
et al. 2007).4 The practical consequences of uncertainty and/or misreporting are that
the willingness to pay (WTP) estimates derived from EP studies may be subject to
hypothetical bias and therefore highly inaccurate.
In this paper we develop a new econometric approach for the treatment of uncertainty
and misreporting for dichotomous choice contingent valuation data. To date most research
has been directed to resolving the issue of uncertainty, either via the inclusion of the Don’t
Know (DK) option or through the use of certainty scales that ask respondents to rate the
certainty of their response. Our approach is to assume that uncertainty may be one
reason for misreporting, although that misreporting may also occur for other reasons. It
is also based on the view that the selection of DK represents a failure of the individual
to recognise their own preferences and, in this sense, constitutes a form of misreporting.
However, we entertain the possibility that uncertainty may not just lead to the selection
of a DK response but may lead to the falsely reported acceptance or rejection. Some may
find our terminology problematic since the word ‘misreporting’ may harbour connotations
that such responses are somehow deliberately misleading. However, our use of the word
4The concept of misreporting is based on the idea of misclassification introduced by Hausman et al.
(1998) and employed by Caudhill and Mixon (2005).
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‘misreporting’ is not meant to imply that respondents necessarily intend to deceive, though
this is another potential reason for misreporting and one which can equally well be dealt
with within the structure we adopt.
As Samnaliev et al. (2006) argue, there is no precise definition of uncertainty, meaning
that it can emerge for many reasons. For example, Li and Mattsson (1995) argued that
survey respondents will have incomplete knowledge and this gives rise to preference uncer-
tainty. Alternatively, Meyerhoff and Liebe (2006) examine protest responses and there is
no reason to suggest that some of these manifest themselves as DKs. Thus, our approach
simultaneously allows for a probability of misreporting on behalf of respondents as well
as capturing uncertainty. That is, it embodies the notion that somebody can report one
thing, when their utility suggests that they should report another. Our approach allows for
probabilities of replying DK or misreporting to depend on the expected levels of utilities of
individual respondents. Hence, our models can investigate whether respondents are more
likely to answer DK if they are predicted to be a YES or NO, and whether YES’s are more
likely to misreport NO and vice versa. The extreme case where DKs can legitimately be
pooled with YESs or NOs, a model specification examined in this literature, can also be
tested. Therefore, models without misreporting or where DKs are pooled emerge as special
cases. In addition, our model allows the misreporting probabilities or the probabilities of
reporting DK, to depend on the expected level of utility of the respondent. Overall, our
approach is both general and more flexible than models currently in the literature.
The Probit models introduced in this paper can be estimated using either a Classical or
Bayesian approach. However, due to the necessary constraints on an number of probability
parameters, a Bayesian approach is advantageous. The Bayesian approach also allows for
an approach to inference that allows non-nested models to be compared using marginal
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likelihoods and associated Bayes Factors . In this paper we describe and show how a
Bayesian approach can be implemented which adds to a small but growing number of
Bayesian applications in the contingent valuation literature (e.g., Arana and Leon, 2005
and Leon and Leon, 2003).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the antecedent literature
in this area. The next section develops the theoretical framework and assumptions we
employ to develop our model. models we propose that taken account of uncertainty and
misreporting. In Section 4 we present the modified Probit we employ in our analysis,
describing the various models that emerge from the structure presented as well as our
estimation methodology. The models developed in the paper are then used to analyse the
Contingent Valuation (CV) data sets of Chambers andWhitehead (2003) and Samnaliev et
al. (2006) in Section 5. Our analysis presents the empirical results along with a discussion
of the key issues identified. Finally in Section 6 we conclude.
2. Antecedent Literature
2.1. Uncertainty
The appropriate treatment of DKs, and uncertainty more generally, has been exten-
sively debated in the EP literature since the NOAA panel’s recommendation to include
a DK (or opt out) option (i.e., Arrow et al. 1993). Despite the importance of this is-
sue many dichotomous choice contingent valuation studies assume that respondents are
certain about their responses such that DK responses, if included, can be discarded with-
out question. However, the situation is changing. Li and Mattson (1995) and Ready et
al. (1995) were the first to address the question of the role of uncertain values in WTP
studies and subsequent authors (e.g. Alberini et al. 2003, Carson et al. 1998, Cham-
bers and Whitehead, 2003, Champ et al. 1997, Loomis and Ekstrand, 1998, Van Kooten,
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2001, Wang, 1997) have catalogued, modified and extended these approaches. Within this
literature uncertainty has been be rationalised by a number of different mechanisms (six
are examined in Shaikh et al. (2007)) which is a reflection of the complex meaning of
uncertainty.
In general, it has become common practice to assess levels of uncertainty using either
an explicit DK option as part of the WTP question or via the use of certainty scales that
require respondents to score the certainty of responses after the WTP question has been
answered. In an effort to determine the relative merits of these two approaches there are
now a number of papers that examine both approaches simultaneously (e.g., Samnaliev et
al. 2006, Whitehead and Cherry, 2006).
The approach presented in this paper is most closely associated with the inclusion of the
DK option and how to deal with these responses.5 For example, Li and Mattson (1995)
simply down-weight the responses of people that are uncertain, while other approaches
make the restrictive assumption that uncertainty arises only because options have similar
levels of utility, and that respondents are only able to make choices if utility thresholds are
exceeded (e.g. Alberini et al. 2003, Wang 1997). This rationale gives rise to ordered logit or
probit specifications such as that used by Groothuis and Whitehead (2002). Other authors
such as Carson et al. (1998) and Chambers and Whitehead (2003) employ a multinomial
Logit treatment of DK’s. As in Hanener and Adamowicz (1998), Chambers andWhitehead
investigate whether DK’s are more like NO’s than YES’s. These results suggest that a DK
is more likely to be a NO than a YES. However, while Carson et al. suggest that a DK can
be taken as a NO, Chambers and Whitehead reject this hypothesis. Unfortunately, the use
5A useful summary and comparison of the various certainty scale methods employed in the literature
is presented by Shaikh et al. (2007).
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of the multinomial Logit (in this context) departs from the utility maximisation framework,
whereby respondents answer YES or NO according to preferences characterised by a unique
set of utility parameters, unless a restriction can be made across the parameter sets that
effectively pool DKs with YES or NO responses. Therefore, if the responses cannot be
pooled, then WTP estimates must effectively ignore the DK responses if the multinomial
model is used.
The paper which is nearest to our research is that of Caudhill and Groothuis (2005).
They explain that there are observed choices from the contingent valuation experiment
and that there are also a number of unobservable choices that relate to the true meaning
of a DK. That is a DK might be a YES, NO or DK. Using a logit specification this implies
that there are five alternatives and they specify a likelihood function as an estimation
problem in missing data. In addition, they also examine various constraints that pertain
to the DK response that allow them to test if DK responses can be pooled with YES or
NO responses. The method we propose is similar in spirit in that we also examine if
DK is really a YES, NO or DK. However, we simultaneously allow for misreporting which
significantly complicates the model we present.
Finally, Svensson (2006) provides an interesting study of how various efforts to deal
with uncertainty associated with hypothetical bias can in turn give rise to other forms of
bias. It is shown that the exclusion of uncertain responses in CV of WTP for traffic risk
reduction biased results in favour of older respondents. These findings provide support
for the use of all data collected and not just that part of the data that appears to meet
researchers requirements regarding certainty of responses.
2.2. Misreporting
Misreporting in EP studies can happen in two or more ways. First, there may be differ-
7
ences between stated and actual preferences (or intentions), where the respondent is aware
of the difference. This type misreporting can be inferred to exist from the misreporting
of past behaviour by individuals (e.g., Granberg and Holmberg, 1991). Second, respon-
dents may be imperfect predictors of their own behaviour/preferences and misreport their
preferences for this reason (and will therefore arguably report DK).
Work on a statistical approach to account for misreporting within the EP literature has
been conducted by Caudill and Mixon (2005) and Balcombe, et al. (2007). These research
papers share a lineage with the misclassification approach employed by Hausman et al.
(1998) using a logit specification.6 They key finding in this research is that there is evidence
of misreporting. For example, Caudhill and Mixon estimate that actual undergraduate
cheating in exams is probably 20 percent higher than findings based on direct questioning
of students. The method employed in this research simply takes the basic logit model and
modifies the likelihood function directly to take account of the possibility of misreporting.
Balcombe et al. employ a similar method, although the way in which they modify the
likelihood function of the logit is different from that of Caudhill and Mixon who follow
Hausman et al. Furthermore, to overcome some of the econometric difficulties, in particular
model selection and identification, that emerge within a Classical context they employed a
Bayesian methodology. In their EP study of consumer food choice and the use of pesticides
Balcombe et al. found strong empirical support for misreporting. This existence of
misreporting resulted in significant downward revision in WTP estimates, of almost 30
percent, for food produced without the use of pesticides.
6The use of the Probit in this paper is not the first time that the Probit has been employed to consider
issues of misclassification. For example, Leece (2000) employed a Probit to examine issues associated with
household choice of mortgage type.
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3. The Theoretical Framework and Assumptions
Utility Ui is represented as:
Ui = α
′zi − bi + vi (1)
where bi is the bid level of respondent i(i = 1..n), α
′zi is the mean WTP for a person with
attributes zi (including an intercept) and vi is a mean zero normal variate with precision
(inverse variance) θ. An individual that is fully aware of their preferences will accept a bid














= x′iβ + ei (2)
Denoting fN
(
x|µ, θ−1) as the normal density with mean µ and variance θ−1 the error in
the normalised utility function is iid normal:
ei ∼ fN (ei|0, 1) (3)
This assumption gives a probit model that is identified through the variance being 1, where
the estimate of WTP can be recovered as µ
′zi√
θ
. If bi is the logged bid then this represents
the logged WTP, in which case the WTP estimate is exp(µ
′zi√
θ












where φ (.) denotes a standard normal density function.
Next we define
yi = 0, 1, •
where 0 denotes a rejection of the bid, 1 for and acceptance and • for a DN. We also define
an indicator variable
δi = 1 if ui > 0 and zero otherwise.
The indicator variable simply tells us whether an individual has positive or negative utility
at a given bid, independent of misreporting. Thus, in the absence of both misreporting
and uncertainty δi=yi. Unlike a standard probit model, a distinction is made between δi
and yi. The variable δi can only take two values (not three) and δi may or may not be
equal to yi where yi is zero or 1. Therefore, people may make choices that diverge from
their preferences.
We now develop our model by attaching probabilities to each of the events and these
probabilities are (as we demonstrate) estimable. First we define the following (where
P (a|b) defines the probability of a given b ) :
P (δ|y, xi) = Ψδ|y,i (5)








P (δ|xi) = Φδi (1−Φi)1−δ (8)
P (y|xi) = Λy,i (9)
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to generalise the Probit model so that we can examine uncertainty and misreporting. The
structure of the model above share simililarities to a specification based on mixtures, where
the population is divided into groups according to δ. However, unlike a mixtures approach,
the underlying utility parameters are homogeneous accross the population.
To operationalise the model we need to make a number of assumptions. Furthermore,
as we explain there are number of different ways in which we can proceed and this gives
rise to a number of different model specifications.
4. Modified Probit: Alternative Model Structures
We can parameterise our model in a number of ways which yields distinctly different









from adding up restrictions and those in equation set (10)) are required. Importantly, not
all of the parameters can be simultaneously fixed across i. The choice of which parameters
to fix (as well as parameters to be estimated), is a question of model choice. For example,
Θ1|0,Θ0|1,Θ•|0,and Θ•|1 can be specified as the parameters that require estimation (over
and above β), with Θ1|1 and Θ0|0 being determined by adding up. However, this choice is
by no means unique. Ψδ|y (i.e. Ψδ|y,i = Ψδ|y for all i) might instead be chosen as parameters
to be estimated. However, one cannot, in general, simultaneously fix parameters such as
Θ1|1 and Ψ1|1 since there is an implied relationship between the two that requires at least
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one must be a function of variables in the utility function. To aid understanding we now
present four unique models that result from this characterisation. As we discuss, one of
the approaches is impractical because of various statistical issues.
4.1. Model 1: The Fixed Probability of Misreporting
Model one is where:
• Θ1|0,Θ0|1,Θ•|0,Θ•|1 are fixed probabilities (and therefore Θ1|1,Θ0|0 by adding up)
This model is in the spirit of Hausman et al. (1998). Under these restrictions, the
remainder of the parameters can be calculated as:
Θ1|1 = 1−Θ0|1 −Θ•|1 (11)
Θ0|0 = 1−Θ0|0 −Θ•|0
Λ1,i = Θ1|0 (1−Φi) + Θ1|1Φi (12)
Λ0,i = Θ0|0 (1−Φi) + Θ0|1Φi
Λ•,i = Θ•|0 (1−Φi) + Θ•|1Φi
Ψ1|1,i =
Θ1|1Φi
Θ1|0 (1−Φi) + Θ1|1Φi
; Ψ0|1,i = 1−Ψ1|1,i (13)
Ψ0|0,i =
Θ0|0 (1−Φi)
Θ0|0 (1−Φi) + Θ0|1Φi
; Ψ1|0,i = 1−Ψ0|0,i
Ψ1|•,i =
Θ•|1Φi
Θ•|0 (1−Φi) + Θ•|1Φi
; Ψ0|•,i = 1−Ψ1|•,i
This model is quite tractable, since their need be no restrictions on the parameters Θy|δ
other than that they lie between zero and one.
4.2. Can other probabilities be treated as estimable parameters?
An alternative approach to treating misreporting and DK’s is to assume that given a
respondent has replied YES, NO or DK, then they have a constant probability of having
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either positive or negative utility, that depends only on what their response was. However,
these restrictions do not fully define the model. A fourth restriction is required. Examples,
of potential models of this sort are:
• Ψ1|1,Ψ1|0 andΨ1|• are fixed probabilities (and thereforeΨ0|1,Ψ0|0 andΨ0|• by adding
up)
• Λ•,i is either also fixed, or a known function of the data.
Alternatively, an identified model could be obtained by fixing
• Ψ0|1,Ψ1|0,Θ•|0,Θ•|1
Unfortunately, these approaches do not prove to be practical. While the remaining
parameters can easily be calculated, feasible values for Ψδ|y can easily lead to the other
parameters in the model being outside the unit interval unless they are highly constrained.








) (Ψ0|•Λ•,i −Ψ0|0 (Λ•,i − 1)− (1−Φi))
Since Λ0,i or Λ1,i must be bounded between 0 and 1, then if Φi is either very small or
very large for any individual in the sample, then Ψ1|1 or Ψ0|0 must be large in order for
Λ0,i or Λ1,i to maintain their bounds. Thus, for any data set Ψ1|1 and Ψ0|0 need to depend
on Φi such that Ψ1|1 → 1 as Φi → 1 and Ψ0|0 → 1 as Φi → 0. A similar problem arises if




. In short fixing Ψ0|1,Ψ1|0 and Ψ1|1 is
an impractical option. It might be possible to functionalise Ψ1|1,i in a different way from
equation (13). However, we propose a more straight forward approach below.
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4.3. Model 2: Variable Probabilities for Don’t Knows.
Should the Θy|δ,i be constants? Arguably, the probability that a respondent with
positive utility for a bid replies DK is likely to increase as the bid increases. That is, if a
respondent is expected to have a very large positive utility, they may also be more aware
that their preference is for the affirmative. This type of reasoning gives rise to alternative
model specifications, the simplest being as follows




where ρ is an additional parameter. In order for the probabilities Θ•|1,i and Θ•|0,i to be
globally bounded on the unit interval, Θ∗•|1 and Θ
∗
•|0,i also need to be on the unit interval
and ρ > 0. This extension creates no significant problems for estimation, although the
nature of the sampler requires an additional step (for β) and the estimation of an additional
parameter.
4.4. Model 3: Variable Probabilities of Misreporting
A similar type of adjustment as in equation (15) can also be made for the misreporting
parameters Θ0|1,i and Θ1|0,i. Arguably, the probability of falsely reporting NO given a
positive utility might decrease as the expected level of utility increases. This argument is
perhaps less compelling than for the case of the DKs. If misreporting is deliberate, then
there is no reason to believe that the probability that the person will report falsely will
change with their expected utility. However, if misreporting is due to uncertainty on the
part of the respondent about their own preferences, then Θ0|1,i and Θ1|0,i are likely to
depend on Φi. For example, somebody is more likely to misreport that they would accept
a bid, when they have negative utility, the higher their (negative) level of utility ui. This
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supports a third specification where, in addition to the conditions in equation (15) above:




A further expansion of the model would be to differentiate between ρ across the different
probability parameters. However, these extensions are not investigated here. Importantly,
as the parameter ρ converges to zero for both Models 2 and 3, the constant probability
model (Model 1) is supported, suggesting that individuals’ misreporting or DK responses
are independent of their level of utility. Such a circumstance would occur if people were
ignoring the bid information.
Finally, other models/hypotheses are of interest. In particular, the hypothesis that
Θ0|1,i = Θ1|0,i = 0 . If this hypothesis holds then there is no support for misreporting
in the model. Also, we will be interested in whether DKs should be treated as YES or
NO (i.e., pooling of DKs), and finally, the difference between results for those models that
incorporate DKs and a model which simply does not use DKs. How we examine these
various model specification is explained in Section 4.6.
4.5. Estimation Methodology


























Each of the three models can be estimated using a Bayesian or Classical approach. The
15











with respect the to the parameters in each model using the expressions in the previous
section.
As we have already stated a Bayesian approach is employed here. A note on the priors
that we use and the Bayesian algorithm we employ is presented in detail in the appendix
to this paper. The algorithm is a Gibbs with Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Only slight
differences are made to the algorithm to estimate each of the models.
In general the Bayesian approach to estimation uses a latent variable approach. There
are advantages in employing Bayesian methods as opposed to Classical in that all of the
parameters in the model (with the exception of β) require inequality constraints, since they
represent probabilities and are therefore between 0 and 1, and this is easily accommodated.
The Bayesian approach to estimation is highly intuitive in the current context, since in
order to model misreporting and/or DKs the latent variables that are generated within
the algorithm can be derived using the probability calculations in the equation set (10).
In addition, by introducing a rejection step within the algorithm we place an inequality
restriction on the bid coefficient as it must be negative.
4.6 Hypothesis Testing
In order to evaluate the performance of the models the marginal likelihoods for each
model were calculated. The marginal likelihood for a model M with parameters P is :
∫
LM (P ) fM (P ) dP
where LM () is the likelihood for model M and fM (P ) are the priors. The ratio of two
marginal likelihoods is referred to as a Bayes Factor. A Bayes factor represents the poste-
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rior odds in favour of the numerated model if the prior odds of each model are equal. The
marginal likelihoods for each model are estimated using the Gelfand and Dey method (see
Gelfand and Dey, (1994) or Koop (2003) pp.104-106, for details). The marginal likelihood
for each of the models can be compared, with the best performing model being the one
with the largest likelihood. This enables Bayesian hypothesis testing for the hypothesis
that ρ = 0. We can also test hypothesis such as (in the case of model 1) Θ1|0 = Θ0|1 = 0,
in which case there is no misreporting in the model.
4.6.1. DK meaning YES or NO?
Previous authors have tested for the "pooling hypothesis", that DK means NO or,
alternatively, YES. In the multinomial Logit this takes the form of restricting across para-
meter sets (e.g., Caudhill and Groothuis, (2005)). In the context of the current model, the
"pooling hypothesis" takes a different form. The concept that DK means YES (or NO)
is not entirely unambiguous once misreporting exists. The best interpretation would be
that:
Ψ1|•,i = Ψ1|1,i (21)
That is, the chance that a respondent has positive utility for a bid is the same for somebody
that answers YES or DK. This is quite different from the hypothesis that people never
report DK if it is NO. Taking again the case of Model 1:
Θ•|0 = 0
⇒ Θ1|0 +Θ0|0 = 1 (22)
⇒ Ψ0|•,i = 0 and Ψ1|•,i = 1
It would somewhat odd to impose this condition if Ψ1|1,i < 1, whereby someone who
replied DK is more likely to have positive utility for the bid than somebody who replied
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YES! Under the constant probability case (Model 1), the hypothesis that Ψ1|•,i = Ψ1|1,i
implies that:
Θ1|1Φi
Θ1|0 (1−Φi) + Θ1|1Φi
=
Θ•|1Φi
Θ•|0 (1−Φi) + Θ•|1Φi
⇒ Θ1|1Θ•|0 = Θ•|1Θ1|0 (23)
In the absence of misreporting, this would imply that Θ•|0 = 0. However, with misreport-
ing, clearly what is required for the last ratio to be positive to be preserved. Thus we have
the two hypotheses:
DK as a YES
Θ1|1Θ•|0 = Θ•|1Θ1|0 (24)
DK as a NO
Θ0|0Θ•|1 = Θ•|0Θ0|1 (25)
In the case where the parameters Θy|δ are not constants (as in Models 2 and 3), these
restrictions can be imposed. However, it leads to a certain arbitrariness in the model,
since one of the parameters Θ•|0,i or Θ•|1,i needs to be solved in terms of the others, thus
they cannot both be set as in Model 2. For this reason, we only consider this test in
the case of Model 1. These conditions can be imposed on the model and tested by using
the marginal likelihood in the standard way. These calculations have been performed for
all models estimated and the results are reported in the next section. Finally, although
a testable hypothesis, it will be useful to consider the difference (in terms of estimated
WTP) between models that incorporate DKs, and those that simply eliminate them from
the sample. All these submodels are also considered in the next section.
4.7. Estimating WTPs
18




be used to compute a WTP estimate for an individual if the bid option is logged or µ
′zi√
θ









where z¯ is the sample mean. With no loss of generality, all elements of zi
other than the intercept can have a zero mean (by subtracting their means). In this case,




where µ0 is the intercept.
The denominator must be constrained to be positive unless researchers are prepared to
admit that respondents have a negative utility for money. However, even very small values
for
√
θ will lead to very large estimates of the WTP. Therefore, it may be sensible to place








than the maximum bid within the sample. This has little or no effect on the resulting
posterior medianWTP, but a very large impact on the mean of the posterior. The posterior
distribution of this quantity can be calculated using the posterior distributions for µ and
√
θ produced by the sampler. Also, providing the same constraints are put on all models,








to be less than some value, creates no problems for
the calculation of the marginal likelihoods.7
5. Model Applications
5.1. Data and Model Specification
In this Section we employ two data sets. The first is Chambers and Whitehead (2003)
who estimated the WTP for a wolf management plan in Minnesota. This data set was
also analysed by Caudhill and Groothuis (2005) in an analysis of DK responses. The
7Constraints on the magnitude of the WTP do create problems for testing the hypothesis that the
either logged price or unlogged price should enter the model. This form of modification means that the
integrating constant for the prior will change. For this reason we do not consider this issue in this paper.
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results they present do not include all the explanatory variables used by Chambers and
Whitehead and they pool the data from the two areas in which the survey was collected,
St. Cloud and Ely. Chambers and Whitehead use the CV method where respondents are
asked questions about their attitudes and "non use motives" in addition to age, sex etc.
Importantly, they also include a DK response option in the CV and a large number of
respondents answered DK. Chambers and Whitehead use a multinomial logit model to
differentiate between DK and NO responses. Among other issues, they explore whether
the DKs are equivalent to NOs as suggested by Carson et al. (1998). They reject this
hypothesis. However, their results suggest that DKs are more similar to NOs than YESs.
The second data set we use was produced by Samnaliev et al. (2006). In this paper
the authors examined WTP for access to public land as part of the US Fee Demonstration
Program (FDP). Two versions of the survey were employed, one of which was a dichoto-
mous choice CV with DK option. In our analysis we estimate almost the same WTP
function, the only difference being that we did not have the Round variable which in the
analysis presented by Samnaliev et al. was found to be statistically insignificant. Using a
logit, Samnaliev et al. estimated a number models in which the DKs were dropped from
the analysis, assumed to be YES responses and assumed to be NO responses. They found
that when DK are dropped the resulting WTP is less than when they assumed YES and
WTP is greater than when DK is assumed NO.
The results presented in this section used the algorithms described in detail in the
appendix. These algorithms were tested using Monte Carlo data and we established that
they accurately identified the various data generating processes examined. For both sets
of data, the burn in phase was set to 2,000 iterations, followed by another 100,000 itera-
tions in which every 10th observation was sampled (so as to decrease the dependence in
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the sequence). Convergence was monitored using visual plots of the sequences of values
produced by the sampler and by modified t-tests for each of the parameters (allowing for
the dependence in the series).
5.2. Marginal Likelihoods and Model Selection
We begin by examining the three model specifications outlined in Section 4. For both
data sets and all models the marginal likelihoods are presented in Table 1.
{Approximate Position of Table 1}
The results in Table 1 clearly indicate that the models with constant probabilities for
misreporting and DKs (Model 1) are preferred to all other model specifications. For exam-
ple, the St. Cloud data Model 1 has a Bayes Factor relative to Model 2 of approximately
exp(191.56−189.5)=7.8. You interpret this as indicating that Model 1 has posterior odds
of nearly eight to one over Model 2 (where prior and posterior odds are equal). For the
Ely data, Model 3 is the least supported, with posterior odds of nearly six to one. We also
find the same result the FDP data although the difference between Model 1 and Model
3 is small. Importantly, for all data sets the marginal likelihoods support the use of the
misreporting model over the model without misreporting Θ1|0 = Θ0|1 = 0. If this restric-
tion is imposed then all data sets see large reductions in their marginal likelihoods relative
to all three other models that incorporate misreporting. Notably, the fall in the marginal
likelihood for the St.Cloud is larger than for the Ely and FDP data, suggesting that for
some reason their is a greater degree of misreporting for this data set. With regard to the
pooling tests, it can be seen that pooling DKs with either YESs or NOs in all data set
reduces the marginal likelihoods, although pooling with the YESs yields a relative lower
marginal likelihood for all data sets. Overall, we would reject the pooling of DKs with
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other responses. In summary, these results imply that while DKs should not be treated as
YESs or NOs, they are more like a YES than a NO. This finding is in contrast with the
previous findings of Chambers and Whitehead (2003) and Caudhill and Groothius (2005).
Given these findings in our remaining analysis, we restrict our discussion to the results
generated by Model 1 since it was the best performing model.
At this point it is also worth commenting on the estimates of the parameter ρ in Models
2 and 3, which were close to zero (around 0.01) in for both data sets. An examination of the
posterior distribution for all of the ρ revealed it to be densely packed near 0 with the tail
of the distribution around 0.05. The posterior distributions of ρ are consistent with the
results for the marginal likelihoods which imply that respondents propensity to misreport
or report DK is not related to the level of their expected utility. Our interpretation of
this finding is that respondent’s misreporting or reporting of DK is, therefore, not due to
being indifferent between options and making a mistake. These results are more consistent
with respondents making arbitrary/or predetermined choices that do not depend on the
bid level. This finding tends to support the view that some respondents are not making
informed choices as is required if the CV is to be meaningful.
5.3. WTP Function Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates for the preferred models are presented in Table 2 Ely and
St.Cloud, and for FPD in Table 3. The results in Table 2, correspond to the results in
Table III of Chambers and Whitehead (2003) and the results in Table 3 with Table 3 in
Samnaliev et al. (2006). In our analysis a y = 1 means YES, such that the signs of
the coefficients will be roughly opposite to the NO results in Chambers and Whitehead.
There is no reason to expect that the coefficient magnitudes should be the same for any of
the data sets given that we employed a Probit framework rather a Logit. Moreover, in a
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Bayesian analysis, standard deviations are not equivalent to standard errors in a Classical
analysis.
{Approximate Position of Tables 2 and 3}
In general there is a strong correspondence between our results (i.e., parameter signs)
and those reported in the earlier research. There are some differences regarding the sta-
tistical robustness. For example, for the ELY data we find that a minority of the variables
have means that are larger in absolute value than the standard deviations. This holds for
INCOME, ETHICAL, EDUCATION, AGE, and GENDER. Chambers and Whitehead
(2003), in contrast, find that INCOME and GENDER are significant. For the St. Cloud
data, exactly half of the variables have absolute posterior means larger than their standard
deviations which is in keeping with Chambers and Whitehead. The FDP results in Table
3 our results are equivalent to Samnaliev et al. (2006) in terms of signs and in most cases
similar in terms of statistical importance. We are not able to include the ‘round’ variable
that is included in Samnaliev et al.since this was not included in the data set given to us.
However, since this variable was insignificant in the analysis of Samnaliev et al. we would
not expect it to have a substantive impact on our results.
Next we examine the misreporting parameters (Θy|δ) in Tables 2 and 3. In Table 2 we
see that for Θ•|1,which indicates DKs reported when a YES should be reported (i.e., have
positive utility for the bid) that 40% and 25% of respondents report DK when they have
a positive utility for the bid. In Table 3 for the FDP data we find 13%. This contrasts
with only 13% and 16% In Table 2 and 10% in Table 3 of respondents reporting DK when
they have a negative utility for the bid.
With regard to the other misreporting parameters, for St. Cloud, misreporting seems
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to be fairly evenly split, with around 13% to 16% of respondents reporting NO when they
mean YES or YES when they mean NO. For the ELY data, there is more significant
evidence that respondents with a positive utility for the bid often reply NO. 23% of
respondents are expected to respond in this way, with only 5% reporting NO when they
mean YES. Finally, for the FDP data we find quite high levels of misreporting at 37%
saying NO when they mean YES and 33% the other way.
To explain the misreporting results in a different way we also present posterior densities
for each of the data sets in Figures 1 (St Cloud), 2 (Ely) and 3 (FDP).
{Approximate Position of Figures 1, 2 and 3}
For example, in the top half of Figure 1 we can see the "NO when YES" (Θ0|1)
density being packed towards zero, but the "YES when NO" (Θ1|0) having a symmetric
distribution away from zero. 8 Overall Figures 1, 2 and 3 are consistent with the marginal
likelihood results in Table 1. They confirm that a DK is more like a YES than a NO.
5.4. WTP Estimates
The final part of our analysis is a comparison of the WTP estimates for our preferred
models and those reported in the original research. These results are summarised in Table
4.
{Approximate Posistion of Table 4}
Beginning with Chambers and Whitehead (2003) we can see that compared with a
standard Bayesian Probit where the DKs have been eliminated from the sample and no
misreporting is assumed there is little difference in the mean for St Cloud and a small
8We also estimate the models using the unlogged bid levels. The substantive findings regarding misre-
porting were unchanged.
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mean for Ely. However, when we examine Model 1, our preferred model specification
for both sets of data we see some more significant differences. For Model 1 we obtain
mean/median WTPs of over $40 for St Cloud and around $4 median and $8 mean for
ELY. The large difference between the mean and median for ELY are due to the highly
skewed posterior which is illustrated in Figure 4 showing the distribution for the WTP
in ELY. The increase in the estimated WTP for St Cloud region relative to the standard
Probit is due to the fact that misreporting and DKs have largely been identified by the
model as YESs. Since the model integrates this information into its estimation procedure,
this increases the resulting WTP. If the mean WTPs are used, then the end result is a near
doubling of the estimated WTPs for both regions relative to the findings of Chambers and
Whitehead. However, if the medians are used, an increased estimate is only found for St.
Cloud. In our opinion the median rather than mean estimates should be used due to the
potentially volatile nature of the mean estimate when the bid coefficient can be close to
zero. It is also the case that by taking account of the uncertainty in the data in this way
the resulting standard deviations associated with the WTPs for Model 1 are quite large
indicating that we need to treat our point estimates with a certainty degree of caution.
Turning to the Samnaliev et al. (2006) data we find much less difference in the WTP
results produced by each method. This greater degree of conformity is reflected in the
WTP posterior distribution in Figure 4.
{Approximate Posiution of Figure 4}
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a new framework that simultaneously deals with
misreporting and DK responses within a dichotomous choice CV framework. A Bayesian
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approach to estimation using a Gibbs with Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to estimate the
posterior densities for the parameters of these models has been introduced and developed.
The various models developed have been applied to two CV data set that have been used
to publish research papers in the literature.
In accordance with previous studies in the literature we found strong evidence that
respondents might reply YES when the may mean NO and vice versa. In two out of the
three data sets we found evidence of misreporting, primarily in favour of the NO option and
the resulting WTP estimates were substantively different in some cases to those previous
reported. We also rejected the hypothesis that DKs could be pooled with YESs or NOs.
However, in contrast to both papers and results previously presented (and others in the
literature) we find that DKs are more likely to be from people who would be predicted to
have a positive utility for the bid. Therefore, a DK, in this model structure, is more similar
to a YES than a NO. This result is not without precedent in the literature. Indeed, Shaikh
et al. (2007) present empirical evidence that there is no systematic reason to assume that
including uncertainty within the analysis leads automatically to a reduction in WTP.
Interestingly we have found no evidence in favour of the hypothesis that DK responses
or misreporting are a function of the expected utility level of participants. This gives
rise to the conclusion that those reporting DK are not necessarily doing so because they
are close to being both a YES and NO (zero utility). Clearly, these findings are data
set specific and they need not apply to other data sets. Indeed, we expect that in many
circumstances ‘warm glow’ effects within EP studies are likely to work in a reverse fashion
to those found in this paper, though this supposition requires further research.
Finally, the procedures outlined here can, in principle, be applied in related contexts.
For example, other forms of CV and Choice Experiments. In CV studies it is becoming
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quite common to use scales of uncertainty rather than a simply DK. With this type of data
, probabilities of replying with different levels of uncertainty, given positive or negative
levels of utility could be estimated using an extension of the models herein. It is also
possible that these probabilities could be conditioned on the attitudinal variables. In the
case of Choice Experiments it may well be possible to include an opt out or DK option




Bayesian estimation and inference requires priors to be specified for the parameters.
Inference using the marginal likelihood is priors requires that the priors are proper (in-
tegrate to 1). Our parameters are composed of β (the coefficient in the Probit) and Ω,
which has three variants specified in Section 4 of the paper. The priors for β (f (β)) are
normal with mean zero and variance V0. The variance is specified as (10
3I) for the results
in the paper. For the parmeters in Ω f (Ω) for Models 1,2 or 3 (and the subcases) the
priors are set as Beta(a1, a2). For the results in the paper the Beta priors Beta(1,2) for
giving a slight penalty for larger values as they tend towards one. This is consistent with
a prior belief that people do not misreport.
A2:The Algorithm (all quantities are as defined in the text)
Given a starting set of values




• 2. {ui} draw: Draw the latent variables {ui} from the truncated normal distribution
with a mean x′iβ and a unit variance
• 3 β draw:























is set a priori)
— 3.2.
— For model 1, accept βprop with probability one.
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or else stick with old β.
• 4. Ωm draw: Generate new parameters
Ωpropm = Ωm + v (27)






















else, stick with old Ωm.(record Ωm)
• Return to step 1.
At each iteration the parameters are recorded and are then used to map the posterior
distributions as in Section 5 of the paper.
A3: Deriving the Posterior Distributions
The Posterior for the parameters and Latent Data where Y denotes all the data and
f (β) and f (Ω) (we do not notationally distinguish the different models below by sub-
scripting Ω) are independent priors:
f ({ui} , {δi} , β,Ω|Y ) ∝ f (Y, {ui} , {δi} |β,Ω) f (β) f (Ω) (29)
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A.3.1 The conditional posterior for the latent data can be factored as:
f ({ui} , {δi} |β,Ω, Y ) = f ({ui} | {δi} , β) f ({δi} |β,Ω, Y ) (30)
The first term is:
f ({ui} | {δi} , β) = Πni=1f (ui|δi, β) (31)
where f (ui|δi, β) is a normal with mean x′iβ and variance 1, truncated below zero if δi is
positive and above zero otherwise. The second term is:
f ({δi} |β,ΩM , Y ) = Πni=1f (δi|β,Ω, yi)
f (δi|β,ΩM , yi) = Ψδi|yi (32)
(which are calculated as in (10)). Therefore, the latent data can be conditionally generated
by generating δi using Ψδ|yi and ui from its truncated normal.
A.3.2. The conditional distribution for Ω
In making a conditioning statement such as f (Ω|β, {ui} , {δi} , Y ) then since the value
of δi is known with probability one given ui :
f (Ω|β, {ui} , {δi} , Y ) = f (Ω|β, {ui}Y ) (33)
Accordingly, the posterior for Ω is:
f (Ω|β, {ui} , Y ) ∝ f (Y, {ui} |β,ΩM) f (Ω) (34)
= f (Y | {ui}β,ΩM) f (Ω) f ({ui} |β,Ω)
where, only the sign of {ui} matters in the first term. Therefore:
f (Y | {ui} , β,Ω) = f (Y | {δi} , β,ΩM)
= Πni=1Θyi|δif (Ω) (35)
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and the second term is not dependent on Ω
f ({ui} |β,ΩM) = f ({ui} |β) (36)
Therefore:
f (Ω|β, {ui, δi} , Y ) ∝ Πni=1Θyi|δif (Ω)
For this posterior a Metropolis Hasting step can be used for Ω.
A.3.3. The Posterior for β
f (β|Ω, {ui} , Y ) ∝ f (Y, {ui} |β,Ω) f (β) (37)
∝ f (Y | {ui} , β,Ω) f ({ui} |β,Ω) f (β)
The first term
f (Y | {ui} , β,Ω) = f (Y | {δi} , β,Ω) = f (Ω)Πni=1Θyi|δi (38)
whereas in the second
f ({ui} |β,Ω) = f ({ui} |β) (39)
is as in the standard normal linear model (with {ui} being the dependent variable). In
model 1 Θyi|δi are not dependent on β. Therefore:
f (β|Ω, {ui} , Y ) ∝ f ({ui} |β,Ω) f (β) (40)
and the posterior for β would then be normally distributed. However, in the case of models
2 and 3.
f (Y | {δi} , β,Ω) ∝ f (Ω)Πni=1Θ∗yi|δiΦ
ρ
i (41)
and since Φρi is dependent on on β this proportionality must be accounted for.
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Table 1. Marginal Likelihoods
St. Cloud Ely FDP
Model 1 -189.5 159.02 -632.85
Model 2 -191.56 -160.78 -635.13
Model 3 -191.32 -163.63 -633.15
Model 1 with Θ1|0 = Θ0|1 = 0 -199.06 -164.73 -638.71
Model 1. Pooling DKs and NOs -203.51 -165.31 -641.64
Model 1. Pooling DKs and YESs -192.39 -164.78 -637.23
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Table 2. WTP Function - Wolf Management Plan
St Cloud Ely


































Table 3. WTP Function - FDP Data



























































* From Chambers and Whitehead (2003) and Samneliev et al. (2006)
** These are standard errors rather than standard deviations
*** These are approximate standard errors computed from CIs
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Figure 1: Distribution of Misreporting Parameters, St Cloud
Figure 2: Distributions of Misreporting Parameters, Ely
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Figure 3: Distribution of Misreporting Parameters FDP Data.
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